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The Syria Accountability
Act: The Wrong Move
by Murhaf Jouejati
Politics in a democracy inevitably
complicate statecraft. The tug-of-war between rival interest groups
over the direction of legislation often distorts the rationality
of foreign policy. In the United States, that struggle regarding
Middle East policy reflects the imbalance of power between the contending
groups. The powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington dwarfs the pro-Arab
lobby, and other interest groups hesitate to confront the former.
Still, the mammoth influence that the pro-Israel lobby commands
in Congress has a deleterious effect on U.S. Middle East policy
in that it systematically distorts its rationality. The "Syria Accountability
Act of 2002" (H.R.4483 and S. 2215) is one case in point.
Introduced in the House on April 18,
2002 and in the Senate a few days later, the bill seeks to impose
further economic and political sanctions against Syria for its continued
occupation of Lebanon, development of ballistic missiles, and illegal
importation of Iraqi oil. Even assuming that these allegations are
accurate and that none of America's regional allies engage in similar
misdeeds, the draft resolution would have been more credible if
it were even-handed. Its sponsors - Rep. Dick Armey (R-TX) and Rep.
Eliot Engel (D-NY) in the House; Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Sen.
Rick Santorum (R-PA) in the Senate - could have called for, among
other things, an end to Israel's occupation of Arab land and the
opening up of its nuclear arsenal to international inspection. They
could have also called for an end to illicit Turkish and Jordanian
imports of Iraqi oil.
Still, the draft resolution would have
made strategic sense had it held the promise of advancing U.S. interests
in the region. It does not. U.S. pressure against Syria, far from
altering Syria's behavior, will have an adverse effect. Evidence
shows that when Syria feels external pressure, it runs in the other
direction. The U.S.-Israel strategic alliance in the early 1980s
pushed Damascus toward the Soviet embrace. The Turkish-Israeli alliance
of 1996 drew Syria closer to Iraq. U.S. pressure will now send Syria
further into the arms of Iran and Iraq.
Another problem with this proposed
legislation is its bad timing. It coincides with unprecedented U.S.-Syrian
cooperation in the fight against global terrorism. Syria's sharing
of intelligence with the CIA following September 11 led to the arrest
of several al-Qaeda members. More importantly, the quality of information
that Syria supplied was such that, according to State Department
official Richard Erdman, it "saved American lives." In light of
this, it makes more political sense to reward Syria than to punish
it.
Moreover, the draft resolution coincides
with mounting Arab anger at America's perceived bias toward Israel.
Sanctions against Syria will provide the 'Arab street' further evidence
of that bias and subject pro-U.S. Arab regimes to more embarrassment.
To be sure, Washington and Damascus hold divergent views on a host
of issues. But the bottom line is that this legislative initiative
is counterproductive. If it passes, Syria will hardly be in a position
to assist the U.S. in key regional initiatives. Syria, for example,
facilitated the release of American hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s.
Syria's participation in the U.S.-led coalition of forces against
Iraq helped legitimize U.S. action against that country during the
Gulf War. Syria's acceptance of the U.S. invitation to the Madrid
conference in the early 1990s paved the way to the Middle East peace
process which, in turn, made possible the peace treaty between Israel
and Jordan and the Oslo agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.
In brief, the U.S. needs Syrian cooperation
on regional issues, and this need is premised on the fact that Syria
is, like it or not, a major player in the Middle East. As Henry
Kissinger once remarked, "war [in the Middle East] is not possible
without Egypt, and peace is not possible without Syria." Therefore,
the wisdom of imposing sanctions against Syria is, to put it mildly,
questionable. Far from altering Syria's external behavior, further
sanctions against Syria will terminate Syria's cooperation in the
war on terrorism, hamstring the administration's new Middle East
peace initiative, force the Syrian government to adopt an anti-American
stance, and embarrass pro-U.S. Arab regimes. While this proposed
legislation might serve Israel's interests, it does not serve those
of the U.S., whose priorities transcend the punishment of Syria.
The U.S. needs Syrian cooperation to fight the war on terrorism,
to promote Middle East peace, and to contain Iraq. It is therefore
crucial for those legislators seeking to promote U.S. interests
in the Middle East to oppose it.
Murhaf Jouejati is Scholar-in-Residence
at the Middle East Institute. The views expressed by the author
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute,
which does not take positions on policy issues.
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