June 4, 1998
Introduction
What do India, Costa Rica, Mexico and Russia have in common? They are among dozens of countries now being threatened with U.S. unilateral economic sanctions at the federal level. The proposed sanctions include -- depending on the country -- restricting exports, imports and investment, opposing multilateral development bank loans, cutting off export financing, and barring government procurement and financial transactions, among others.Just fifteen months has passed since the NAM published A Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions For Foreign Policy Purposes 1993-96 (with analysis and recommendations). The report found that, in just four years, 61 U.S. laws and executive actions were enacted authorizing unilateral economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes against 35 countries that together represent 2.3 billion potential consumers of U.S.-made goods and $790 billion worth of export markets. The report concluded that all economic sanctions, in order to be effective, should be multilateral except in the most unusual and extreme circumstances. In such circumstances, the NAM recommended that sanctions should satisfy specific criteria relating to effectiveness, availability from foreign suppliers and enforceability, among others.
This follow-up report summarizes developments at the federal level since the publication of the catalog (i.e. the 105th Congress). It does not address the 14 sanctions measures that have been under consideration at the state and local level. These measures involve selective purchasing and investment restrictions on companies doing business in Burma, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey and Vietnam, among others.
A 1997 NAM report found that, from 1993 to 1996, 61 U.S. laws or executive actions were enacted authorizing unilateral economic sanctions against 35 countries. It should be made clear at the outset that this report is qualitatively different than the 1997 catalog. The 1997 catalog covered sanctions measures enacted into law, whereas this report only covers sanctions bills pending before the 105th Congress. It remains to be seen how many of the proposed sanctions will actually be enacted into law in the waning days of the 105th Congress. The NAM urges the Congress and the Administration to avoid a repeat performance of 1996 -- the last session of the 104th Congress -- when 23 sanctions measures were signed into law.
Pending Sanctions Bills and Executive Actions 1997-98 [See Annex, p. 6]
(i) Country-Specific Sanctions Measures26 unilateral economic sanctions bills are pending in the 105th Congress specifically targeting 10 countries, including China, Russia, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, Syria, Mexico, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Nigeria and Sudan.
(ii) Generic Sanctions Measures
11 other bills target an unlimited number of countries determined to have engaged in a particular activity. These so-called generic sanctions include:
- a prohibition on Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) financing in any country that did not cast its United Nations vote with the U.S. at least 50 percent of the time;
- a ban on the importation of goods produced abroad with "child labor," defined as an individual less than either 14 or 15 years of age;
- export prohibitions and controls and bars on Ex-Im and OPIC financing in any country determined to be engaged in religious persecution [70-80 countries, according to the State Department];
26 unilateral economic sanctions bills are pending in the 105th Congress targeting 10 countries… 11 other bills target an unlimited number of countries determined to have engaged in an objectionable activity…and 4 executive orders/determinations were issued… from 1997 to 1998.
- a prohibition on tariff treatment equivalent to a NAFTA country for Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries that support membership of the Government of Cuba into the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM [23 countries in total, including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and 18 Caribbean island nations]
- a prohibition on the sale of military aircraft to Latin American countries [43 Latin American countries listed]; and
- voting against loans from international financial institutions (e.g. World Bank and IMF) to countries not having undertaken sufficient anti-corruption measures [unknown number of countries].
(iii) Presidential Executive Orders/Determinations
- Burma: Executive Order 13047 of May 21, 1997, invoking a prohibition on new investment.
- Sudan: Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, imposing a comprehensive trade embargo.
- India: Presidential Determination No. 98-22 of May 13, 1998, prohibiting the sale of specific goods and technology and U.S. bank loans to the Government of India, terminating sales of defense articles and design and construction equipment and services, and shutting down Ex-Im, OPIC and TDA.
- Pakistan: Presidential Determination No. 98-XX of May 30, 1998, prohibiting the sale of specific goods and technology and U.S. bank loans to the Government of Pakistan, terminating sales of defense articles and design and construction equipment and services, and shutting down Ex-Im, OPIC and TDA.
Implications of Developments in the 105th Congress 1997-98
(i) The Need For Equivalent Sanctions Imposed On A Multilateral Basis: The Case Of India And PakistanThe one feature common to the myriad economic sanctions considered or actually imposed from 1997 to 1998 is that they are all unilateral; not a single allied country is imposing sanctions measures equivalent to those imposed by the U.S. The most recent study on the effectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions indicated that unilateral sanctions outside a multilateral framework failed to achieve the desired objective almost 90 percent of the time, and that the rate of failure is increasing as a result of the effects of globalization.
One little-noticed sanction cited in last year's NAM Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanctions For Foreign Policy Purposes 1993-96, was the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. Since the law did not cite individual countries by name, India and Pakistan were not included in the report's list of 35 countries where U.S. trade and investment were restricted in just the four year period from 1993 to 1996.
The chain of events in India and Pakistan highlight the futility of unilateral U.S. sanctions as a deterrent. India detonated three nuclear devices on May 11, triggering President Clinton's announcement of unilateral sanctions on May 13. Notwithstanding the imposition of U.S. sanctions, less than a day later (on May 14), India announced that it had tested two more nuclear devices. Fully aware of the impact of the U.S. sanctions (and perhaps more exposed and economically dependent that India), Pakistan decided to conduct five nuclear tests two weeks later.
The one feature common to the myriad economic sanctions considered or actually imposed from 1997 to 1998 is that they are all unilateral… The case of India and Pakistan most clearly demonstrates the need for equivalent economic sanctions imposed on a multilateral basis… To the extent the U.S. sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan go beyond what can be agreed on a multilateral basis, such sanctions are a wasting asset and should be rescinded. The case of India and Pakistan most clearly demonstrates the need for equivalent economic sanctions imposed on a multilateral basis if they are ever to succeed as a deterrent. But equivalent sanctions measures do not appear to be forthcoming. Sanctions are being considered by allies, but they are in no way equivalent to the trade and financial sanctions already imposed by the U.S., thereby undercutting their effectiveness. To the extent the current U.S. sanctions go beyond what can be agreed on a multilateral basis, such sanctions are a wasting asset and should be rescinded.
(ii) Avoiding Sweeping, "One Size Fits All" Sanctions: Religious Persecution
Another discernible trend in current U.S. sanctions is the consideration of sweeping sanctions measures that do not specifically target or name individual countries, but rather seek to punish any country determined at a later date to be engaged in an objectionable activity. The objectionable activity ranges from the abhorrent (any country engaged in religious persecution) to the more benign (any country not voting with the U.S. more than 50 percent of the time at the United Nations). 11 such measures are under consideration in the 105th Congress.
On May 14, 1998, the House of Representatives approved H.R. 2431, the Freedom From Religious Persecution Act. A related bill, S. 1868, is being considered in the Senate. H.R. 2431 establishes a State Department Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring, headed by a Director, to identify governments engaged in violations of religious freedom. Based on the Director's reports, the Secretary of State is to make findings of religious persecution and determine the applicability of sanctions. All U.S. exports to any government actively involved in religious persecution would be prohibited. U.S. export and investment-related financing would also be barred.
Based on the annual State Department Human Rights Report, which includes consideration of religious persecution, it is estimated that 70-80 countries are engaged in religious persecution of one form or another. The drawbacks to such a sweeping, "one size fits all," automatic approach are considerable:
A discernible trend from 1997 to 1998 is the adoption of sweeping sanctions measures that target any country engaged in particularly objectionable activity, such as religious persecution… The so-called Wolf-Specter Bill imposes automatic sanctions [against U.S. exporters, and not the oppressors] without regard to the informed opinion of those actually facing persecution, who could be harmed, not helped, by the law.
- the automatic sanctions are imposed without regard to the informed opinion and wishes of those actually facing persecution, who, depending on country-specific circumstances, could be harmed, not helped, by U.S. sanctions;
- with only limited waiver authority ("national security" or to "substantially promote" the purposes of the act), the President cannot use the proper range of instruments at his disposal to more effectively target a regime's unique vulnerabilities; and
- for the most part, the sanctions do not hurt the oppressors, but American exporters and their workers, who would be prevented from participating in major infrastructure projects in developing countries, thereby handing over billions in contracts to our French, German and Japanese competitors.
The recent imposition of U.S. sanctions against India and Pakistan also illustrates the need to avoid sweeping, "one size fits all," unilateral approaches. The so-called Glenn Amendment does not mention India or Pakistan by name, instead targeting any non-nuclear state detonating a nuclear explosive device. The sanctions are automatic and unilateral, with absolutely no regard whatsoever for the necessity of a multilateral approach to curb the actions of India, Pakistan and others. The sanctions law, which was meant to deter, offers no guidance as to what would happen if the deterrent failed. There is virtually no waiver authority, nor any attempt to allow the President to tailor sanctions to target the unique vulnerabilities of individual countries, or to offer incentives on an expedited basis to prevent future tests.
(iii) Process-Oriented Sanctions Reform: The Case of Burma
Increasingly, there has been little rhyme or reason as to where U.S. sanctions come from and how they are implemented. U.S. policy toward Burma/Myanmar was set in legislation that was enacted on September 30, 1996, as part of an Appropriations Bill [Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, the Cohen-Feinstein amendment]. Neither the Senate Foreign Relations Committee nor the House International Relations Committee had a role in developing that statement of policy.
Of course, it is possible that the result would have been the same, but it is more likely that the expertise and judgment that reposes in these committees would have resulted in a more informed and sounder statement of policy.
The Administration acted on April 22, 1997, when the Secretary of State announced the President's intention to impose a ban on new US investment in Burma. At the press conference announcement, there was no coherent explanation of this new action, aside from the judgment that the "repression by the military authorities of the democratic opposition in Burma has deepened since the enactment of the legislation" the previous September.
Certainly there was no rationale put forward as to why the US had failed to get any other nation to agree with our assessment of the situation, or the Administration's reasons for believing that somehow this sanction would bring about the desired results. It is hard to locate an event that provoked the announcement, but clearly the timing in relationship to ASEAN's consideration of Myanmar's bid for membership could not have been worse for the stated US policy of keeping Myanmar out of ASEAN. In effect, the US announcement forced ASEAN to announce the decision to admit Myanmar.
A month after the Secretary's announcement, the President issued the Executive Order 13047 prohibiting new investment in Burma. Aside from relying on the legislation of the previous year, the President invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The President determined that "the actions and policies of the government of Burma constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States." The President declared a national emergency to deal with that threat. Obviously, there was no factual basis for such a finding, and so the invocation of emergency powers was an abuse. This has become commonplace. Last December, the President submitted a report to Congress concerning the national emergency, and he affirmed the emergency again.
No hearings by the appropriate Congressional committees were held concerning the Burma sanctions measures, which were attached to an appropriations bill… No rationale put forward by the Administration as to why the U.S. failed to get any other nation to agree with our assessment. There was no factual basis for a declaration of a national emergency regarding Burma, so the invocation of emergency powers was an abuse. Implementing regulations from the US Treasury Department were not issued until one year after the publication of the Executive Order. Why is that important? In the absence of implementing regulations, responsible US companies err on the side of extreme conservatism in interpreting the Executive Order--and that causes a competitive harm, because companies walk away from opportunities because of the lack of clarity of the US sanctions.
In addition to the investment ban of last year, the US imposes the following sanctions against Burma: suspension of aid, withdrawal of GSP and OPIC, an arms embargo, blocking assistance from international financial institutions, visa restrictions on senior leaders and downgrading the US representation in Myanmar from Ambassador to Charge. And on top of that list, there are also state and local sanctions relating to any commercial dealings with Burma.
The result has been to isolate the US from Burma. Our sanctions are a wasting asset that have not assisted in moving the Burmese authorities in the direction we would like. The policy is at odds with virtually all Asian governments who pursue "constructive engagement." The US must understand that it does not have the ability to further isolate Burma; we can only further isolate the U.S. from activity in Burma The case of Burma most clearly underscores the need for process oriented reform. [See Conclusions]
(iv) The Unintended Consequences of Extraterritoriality: The Case of Iran
Unfortunately, the U.S. appears to have learned few lessons from the past regarding the extraterritorial application of sanctions laws. Take the case of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which requires the President to impose two or more of any of the following six sanctions against foreign companies investing more than $20 million in the development of Iran's petroleum resources: 1) import restrictions against the targeted entity; 2) prohibition against participation in any U.S. government procurement project; 3) sanctioned financial institutions cannot be designated as primary dealers in U.S. government debt instruments or serve as a repository for U.S. government funds; 4) prohibition on loans of more than $10 million from U.S. financial institutions to any sanctioned person over any 12 month period; 5) denial of export licenses for controlled goods or technology; and 6) denial of credits from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The President may waive the imposition of sanctions if he determines that it is important to the national interest to grant a waiver.
On May 18, the President determined that the investment by the firms Total (France), Gazprom (Russia), and Petronas (Malaysia) in the developments of Iran's South Pars gas field was covered by ILSA, but that it was important to the national interest to waive the imposition of sanctions against the three firms involved. The primary reasons cited for the waiver were the "significant, enhanced cooperation" achieved with the European Union and Russia in accomplishing ILSA's primary objective of inhibiting Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and support of terrorism. Though project waivers were granted, the President determined that it would not be appropriate to grant country-wide waivers. However, the statement noted that "we would expect that a review of our national interests in future ILSA cases involving Iran similar to South Pars, involving exploration and production of Iranian oil and gas, would result in like decisions with regard to waivers for EU companies."
ILSA has been detrimental to the national interest of the U.S. The law's adverse impact extends well beyond the context of Iran. ILSA is a perpetual irritant in U.S. relations with our foremost political and military allies, effectively undermining the building of multilateral coalitions, which proved necessary in recent times against Iraq in the United Nations Security Council, and will be necessary in the context of non-proliferation in South Asia and beyond.
Any Administration would be forced to grant waivers under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in order to avert a major crisis in relations with our foremost military and political allies, whose support will be essential in building multilateral coalitions… There is no reason to maintain the U.S. trade and investment embargo with Iran, with the exception of U.S. goods and technology that would promote Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism. Moreover, any imposition of sanctions under ILSA would almost certainly result in tit-for-tat retaliation against U.S. firms, not to mention possible violations of U.S. international legal obligations.
In short, there is little choice but for any Administration to grant waivers under ILSA in order to avert a major crisis in relations with our foremost military and political allies. In light of this fact, there is no reason whatsoever to maintain the U.S. trade an investment embargo against Iran, with the exception of U.S. goods and technology that would promote Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism. Substantially all provisions of Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, which clarified previous executive orders and confirmed that all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S. persons is prohibited, should therefore be rescinded.
Conclusion
The NAM recommendations last year concerning unilateralism, extraterritoriality and the need for process-oriented reform are perhaps more valid today than they were just 15 months ago. The NAM strongly urges the Congress and the Administration to exercise a degree of restraint in the waning days of the 105th Congress that was noticeably lacking in 1996 - the last session of the 104th Congress - when 23 sanctions measures were signed into law.
On a more positive note, certain sanctions were lifted, most notably with regard to Vietnam and Colombia. Another positive development was the introduction of sanctions H.R. 2708 and S. 1413, which establish a more deliberative and disciplined policy framework for U.S. economic sanctions policy. The sanctions reform bills are prospective. They do not affect existing sanctions. Before a unilateral sanction is imposed, Congress and the President would be required to request information about, and report on: 1) the likely effectiveness of the sanction; 2) the likely economic costs for American industry and agriculture; 3) the likelihood of a serious backlash against other U.S. humanitarian, security and foreign policy objectives; and 4) whether other policy alternatives, such as multilateral initiatives or diplomacy, have been tried and failed. The bill also provides guidelines for U.S. sanctions bills and initiatives, including Presidential waiver authority; the protection of contract sanctity; agricultural-trade compensation; and a two-year sunset provision so that measures are automatically terminated unless a justification exists for their continuation.
The Congress and the Administration should exercise a degree of restraint in the waning days of the 105th Congress that was noticeably lacking in 1996 -- the last session of the 104th Congress -- when 23 sanctions measures were signed into law.
One positive development concerning sanctions that could prevent policy failures from occurring in the future is the proposed Sanctions Reform Bill (H.R. 2708 and S. 1413), which establishes a more deliberative and disciplined policy framework.
Annex: Unilateral Economic Sanctions Bills Before the 105th Congress and Executive Actions Bill or Executive Action Target Country Description Status H.R. 87. Unnamed. January 7, 1997. China Instructs U.S. directors of international financial institutions to vote against loans to China unless the President certifies that China respects internationally recognized human rights, among other sanctions. Referred to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on 01/07/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy on 02/14/97 H.R. 320. Chinese Slave Labor Act. January 7, 1997. China Prohibits importation from China of articles made with forced labor. Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means on 01/07/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Trade on 01/14/97 H.R. 331. Freedom and Self-Determination for the Former Soviet Union Act. January 7, 1997. Russia Prohibits foreign assistance to Russia, and instructs U.S. directors of international financial institutions to vote against loans, unless Russia satisfies certain requirements relating to Russia's relations with its neighbors, arms control and economic reform. Referred to the Committee on International Relations on 01/07/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy 02/14/97. S. 141. Foreign Aid Reform Act of 1997. January 21, 1997. Any country that did not cast its United Nations vote in agreement with the U.S. at least 50 percent of the time. Prohibits economic assistance and bars Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) support. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 01/21/97. H.R. 748. Prohibition On Financial Transactions With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997. February 13, 1997. Syria Effectively adds Syria to list of countries with which all U.S. financial transactions are prohibited by removing exceptions provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of Treasury. Measure passed House on 07/08/97. Placed on calendar in Senate on 07/23/97. H.R. 958. Unnamed. March 5, 1997. Mexico Prohibits United States assistance to Mexico unless Mexico meets certain narcotics control requirements. Instructs U.S. directors of multilateral development banks to vote against loans to Mexico. Referred to the Committee on International Relations on 03/05/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy on 03/14/97. H.R. 1328. Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1997. April 15, 1997. Any country that exports goods to the U.S. produced by child labor. Prohibits the importation of goods produced abroad with "child labor," defined as an individual less than either 14 or 15 years of age, depending on the national laws of the target country. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, on 04/15/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on 04/29/97. H.R. 1685. Unnamed. May 20, 1997. General applicability (Cuba, Laos, China, North Korea, Sudan, and Vietnam explicitly mentione); Sudan Establishes an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring in the State Department; provides for the imposition of sanctions, including a ban on Export-Import bank financing and instructions to vote against loans in international financial institutions, against countries engaged in a pattern of religious persecution as determined by the director of the office; prohibits financial transactions with Sudan, bars imports from Sudan and prohibits U.S. computer exports and new investment. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, the Judiciary, Banking and Financial Services, and Rules, on 05/20/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy on 06/17/97. Bill or Executive Action Target Country Description Status S. 804. War Crimes Prosecution Facilitation Act of 1997. May 23, 1997. Croatia, Yugoslavia Restricts economic assistance, including instructions to vote against loans in the international financial institutions, for countries providing sanctuary to indicted war criminals or countries that exercise "effective control" (i.e. Croatia and Yugoslavia) of areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina where alleged war criminals are still at large. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 05/23/97. S. 810. China Sanctions and Human Rights Advancement Act. May 23, 1997. China Denies U.S. entry to certain government officials; instructs U.S. directors of international financial institutions to vote against loans and to oppose modification of the single country loan limit; requires an annual report on human rights practices; requires publication of a list of companies owned by the People's Liberation Army; provides training for immigration officers regarding religious persecution and provides aid for democracy promotion. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on 05/23/97. H.R. 1786. Unnamed. June 4, 1997. Nigeria Bars U.S. assistance; instructs U.S. director of international financial institutions to vote against any loan; prohibits air transportation; bars the sale or financing of defense articles; bars Export-Import Bank or Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) support; bars new investment and freezes Nigerian assets in U.S. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Banking and Financial Services, Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Judiciary, on 06/04/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy on 06/27/97. S. 873. Prohibition On Financial Transactions With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997. June 10, 1997. Syria Effectively adds Syria to countries with which all U.S. financial transactions are prohibited by removing exceptions provided in regulations issued by the Secretary of Treasury Referred to the Committee on Judiciary on 06/10/97. H.R. 2011. China Sanctions and Human Rights Advancement Act. June 23, 1997. China Denies entry into U.S. of certain government officials; imposes restrictions on multilateral development bank assistance; and bars imports of products made by Poly or Norinco. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Banking and Financial Services, Ways and Means, and the Judiciary in House on 06/23/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy in House on 07/14/97. H.R. 2085. Unnamed. June 26, 1997. China Export-Import Bank assistance for exports to China conditioned on adherence to a corporate code of conduct. Referred to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on 06/26/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy in House on 07/14/97. H.R. 2121. War Crimes Prosecution Facilitation Act of 1997. July 9, 1997. Croatia, Yugoslavia Restricts economic assistance; instructions to vote against loans in the international financial institutions, for countries providing sanctuary to indicted war criminals or that exercise "effective control" (i.e. Croatia and Yugoslavia) of areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina where alleged war criminals are still at large. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services in House on 07/09/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy in House on 07/30/97. Bill or Executive Action Target Country Description Status H.R. 2188. Unnamed. July 17, 1997. China Prohibits most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to goods that are produced, manufactured or exported by the People's Liberation Army or a Communist Chinese military company. Referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committees on International Relations, National Security, and Banking and Financial Services in House on 07/17/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy in House on 07/30/97. H.R. 2196. Communist China Subsidy Reduction Act of 1997. July 17, 1997. China The Secretary of the Treasury is required to reduce the amount that would otherwise be paid by the United States to an international financial institution by an amount equal the United States portion of any "subsidy" (whether direct or indirect, or in the form of loans, cash, or in-kind assistance) provided by the institution. Referred to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on 07/17/97. Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy on 07/30/97. S. 1083. United States-People's Republic of China National Security and Freedom Protection Act of 1997. July, 29, 1997. China Bars the importation of any product made by the People's Liberation Army, and prohibits the sale of any debt on the U.S. bond market which benefits the People's Liberation Army or a Communist Chinese military company; renegotiation of the memorandum of Understanding on the use of forced labor. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations in House on 07/29/97. H.R. 2296. Unnamed. July 30, 1997. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and 18 island nations of the Caribbean. Withholds assistance to any CBI country that uses its voice or vote in CARICOM or CACM to support membership for Cuba and prohibits provision of tariff treatment equivalent to a NAFTA country. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means in House on 07/30/97. H.R. 2345. Latin America Security Promotion Act. July 31, 1997. General applicability (43 Latin American countries listed). Prohibits the sale, lease, or other transfer of attack, bomber, or fighter aircraft to Latin American countries. Referred to the House Committee on International Relations. H.R. 2431 Freedom From Religious persecution Act of 1997. September 8, 1997. General applicability (China, Iran, Turkey explicitly mentioned) ; Sudan Requires the Director to report to specified congressional committees on countries and entities engaged in religious persecution, identifying the category of persecution and listing persecution facilitating products. Prohibits: (1) Federal agencies and U.S. persons from exporting goods, including religious persecution facilitating products, to countries and responsible entities engaged in religious persecution; and (2) U.S. assistance to such countries. Requires the U.S. Executive Director of each multilateral development bank and of the International Monetary Fund to oppose multilateral assistance to such countries. Passed by the House. Bill or Executive Action Target Country Description Status S. 1164. China Policy Act of 1997. September 11, 1997. China Prohibits the Secretary of State (except in the case of a presidential waiver in the U.S. national interest) from issuing any visa to, and the Attorney General from admitting to the United States, certain high-ranking officials of the Chinese Government who have been involved in limiting the free exercise of religion and other human rights in China. Requires votes by the appropriate U.S. Executive Directors to deny multilateral assistance by international development banks. Directs the President to: (1) prohibit the importation into the United States of products (with specified exceptions) produced by any affiliate of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the China Poly Group (also known as Polytechnologies Incorporated or BAOLI), and the China North Industries Group (Norinco); (2) direct the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to deny or impose restrictions on the entry into the United States of foreign nationals employed by such entities; (3) prohibit the issuance of licenses for U.S. Munitions List exports to such nationals or entities; (4) prohibit the export of controlled goods or technology to them; (5) direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not to approve the issuance of credit to them; (6) prohibit U.S. nationals from issuing guarantees for loans or investments, or extending credit, to them; and (7) prohibit U.S. agencies and U.S. nationals from entering into any contract with such nationals or entities for the procurement of goods or services. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings held on September 17, 1997. S. 1200. International Anticorruption Act of 1997. September 19, 1998. General applicability Instructs the U.S. to vote against loans from international financial institutions to countries certified as not conducive to U.S. business. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 09/19/97. H.R. 2605. Communist China Subsidy Reduction Act of 1997. October 2, 1997. China Requires the U.S. to oppose the making of concessional loans by international financial institutions to any entity in China. Passed the House of Representatives. 11/06/97. H.R. 2677. International Child Labor Elimination Act of 1997. October 21, 1997 General applicability (countries that employ child labor). Requires the Treasury Department to prohibit the entry of any manufactured article from countries and industries that use child labor; shuts down the Export-Import Bank, OPIC, and instructs the U.S. to vote against loans from international financial institutions; imposes criminal and civil penalties. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, and Banking and Financial Services. 10/21,/97. S. 1311 Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. October 23, 1997. Entities in Russia. Bars Ex-Im and OPIC financing in any transaction involving an entity that has transferred items contributing to Iran's efforts to develop ballistic missiles. Referred to Committee on Foreign Relations on October 23, 1997. H.R. 2709. Iran Missile Sanctions Proliferation Act of 1997. October 23, 1997. Foreign persons who transfer items contributing to Iran's to produce ballistic missiles (Russia). Requires imposition on such persons of minimum two-year sanctions prohibiting: (1) sales to such persons of items on the United States Munitions List (and terminating sales of any controlled U.S. arms); (2) the export to such persons of dual use goods and technology; and (3) the provision of U.S. financial assistance, including Ex-Im and OPIC. Passed the House of Representatives. 11/12/97. Passed the Senate. 5/22/98. Executive Order 13067. November 3, 1997 Sudan Comprehensive trade embargo. Awaiting implementing rules and regulations. H.R. 2930. Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. November 8, 1997. Foreign persons who transfer items contributing to Iran's to produce ballistic missiles (Russia). Requires imposition on such persons of minimum two-year sanctions prohibiting: (1) sales to such persons of items on the United States Munitions List (and terminating sales of any controlled U.S. arms); (2) the export to such persons of dual use goods and technology; and (3) the provision of U.S. financial assistance, including Ex-Im and OPIC. Referred to the House Committee on International Relations. 11/08/97. Bill or Executive Action Target Country Description Status H.R. 2983. Caucasus Peace and Stability Act of 1997. November 9, 1997. Azerbaijan. Bars U.S. from operating, investing or trading in goods or services from Azerbaijan; bars issuance of licenses for any dual use goods or services; requires the U.S. to vote against loans from international financial institutions. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services. 11/09/97. H.R. 3023. Unnamed. November 9, 1997. Generic applicability (any entity transferring items or technologies contributing to weapons proliferation.) Bars Ex-Im and OPIC participation in any transaction involving cited entities.; bars issuance of export licenses to cited entities. Referred to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and in addition to the Committees on Banking and Financial Services, and International Relations. 11/09/97. H.R. 3105 Unnamed. January 27, 1998. Vietnam Bars the President from waiving the prohibition on Ex-Im and OPIC financing in Vietnam. Referred the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Banking and Financial Services. 01/27/98. H.R. 3158/3159. Unnamed. February 4, 1998. Vietnam Prohibits the President from waiving non-discriminatory trade treatment, commercial agreements, and Ex-Im and OPIC financing for Vietnam. Referred to the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Banking and Financial Services and the Committee on Ways and Means. 02/04/98. S. 1868. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. March 26, 1998. General applicability (governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of religious freedom, or tolerating religious persecution) Requires the President to impose one or more of a menu of 16 possible sanctions against offending governments, including a ban on the issuance of specific licenses to export any goods or technology, a ban on loans, and shutting down Ex-Im, OPIC and TDA. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 03/26/98. H.R. 3616 National Defense Authorization Act FY 1999. April 1, 1998. China Approval of an amendment to place U.S. satellites on the U.S. Munitions List and make their export subject to licensing requirements established by the Arms Export Control Act. Bill and amendment approved by the House. 05/21/98. H.R. 3806. Freedom From Religious Persecution Act of 1998. May 7, 1998. General applicability (China, Iran, Turkey and Sudan explicitly mentioned) Requires the Director to report to specified congressional committees on countries and entities engaged in religious persecution, identifying the category of persecution and listing persecution facilitating products. Prohibits: (1) Federal agencies and U.S. persons from exporting goods, including religious persecution facilitating products, to countries and responsible entities engaged in religious persecution; and (2) U.S. assistance to such countries. Requires the U.S. Executive Director of each multilateral development bank and of the International Monetary Fund to oppose multilateral assistance to such countries. Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Banking and Financial Services. 05/07/98. Presidential Determination No. 98-22. Sanctions Against India for Detonation of a Nuclear Device. May 13, 1998. India Shuts down Ex-Im, OPIC and TDA; terminates sales of defense articles, services or design and construction services; prohibits U.S. banks from making loans to the government of India; prohibits export of specific goods and technology. Awaiting implementing regulations. H.R. 3886. Unnamed. May 14, 1998. China. Prohibits the export of missile equipment and technology to China until China satisfies certain conditions. Referred to the Committee on International Relations on May 14, 1998. Presidential Determination No. 98-XX. Sanctions Against Pakistan for Detonation of a Nuclear Device. May 30, 1998. Pakistan Shuts down Ex-Im, OPIC and TDA; terminates sales of defense articles, services or design and construction services; prohibits U.S. banks from making loans to the government of Pakistan; prohibits export of specific goods and technology. Awaiting implementing regulations.
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