Economic sanctions come at a cost as U.S. companies are denied access to markets. It is well therefore to assess whether sanctions achieve their desired objectives. Work on this subject was published by the Institute for International Economics in 1990, the two volume "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered", by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Some 116 cases worldwide are examined covering the period 1914 to 1990. The study defines the objectives and measures the success of sanctions in achieving those objectives. In the discussion that follows, material from the Study is summarized in text, charts and tables. References to the "Institute" and the "Study" are shorthand for the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott study and the data therein.

The Study applies a scoring method and defines categories of foreign policy objectives against which success or failure are scored. Results of a sanction are rated as a "success score" against objectives on a scale of 1 to 16. Two indices comprise this score: (a) policy result on a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 is a failure and 4 is a successful outcome; (b) sanctions contribution on a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 is a zero or negative contribution, and 4 is a significant contribution to the outcome. The " success score" on the scale of 1 to 16 is formed by multiplying the policy result index by the sanctions contributions index.

In evaluating economic sanctions, the Study established that the nature of foreign policy objectives are a very important variable. Accordingly, five major groups of objectives were established for purposes of evaluation:

Group 1: Modest Change in Policy such as settlement of an expropriation dispute or limited improvement in human rights.

Group 2: Destabilizing a Government normally will employ companion measures, typically covert action and quasi-military operations. By its nature, this group includes changing policies. An example is the long standing campaign against Cuba.

Group 3: Disrupting Military Adventures applies in situations where sanctions seek to avert a conflict on a scale much less than World Wars I and II. An example is UK sanctions against Argentina over the Falkland Islands.

Group 4: Impairing Military Potential by targeting the military potential of the target country as in World Wars I and II, and the Cold War COCOM sanctions against the USSR and its allies.

Group 5: Other Major Policy Changes seek to change a target country's policies in a major way, including the case of the U.N. campaign against South Africa on Apartheid.

From 1914 through World War II the pattern of applying economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is steady at a relatively low level of frequency and numbers. Following World War II however, sanctions increased dramatically. Their application also became broader in the objectives sought. Where a military factor had dominated previous goals, now other foreign policy goals became more common. They included destabilization of foreign governments, and comparatively more modest foreign policy objectives such as: human rights; halt nuclear proliferation; settle expropriation claims; fight international terrorism. For the period, the U.S. engaged in sanctions , both unilateral and multilateral, in 79 of the 116 cases or 68% of the episodes documented. Unilateral U.S. sanctions for the period were 62 cases, or 53% of the total. Figure 1 below presents economic sanctions worldwide from 1914 through 1990, and plots U.S. unilateral economic sanctions for the same period.

Following World War II, sanctions grew significantly compared to the pre-war period. U.S. unilateral sanctions in particular increased considerably. From 1945 to 1990, there were 107 episodes worldwide; the U.S was involved in 74 (69%) of the 107; unilateral U.S. numbered 60 (52%). Tables 1-5 below correspond to the five major groups of foreign policy objectives as defined by the Institute. The scoring applied within each group from which the tables were derived, was defined above where a score of 9 or more is declared a "successful outcome"; 8 or below, a " failure" (9 indicates that sanctions contributed to a "modest" outcome; a score of 16, sanctions contributed "significantly" to a successful outcome). In the tables, the sanctions success rate in % is shown for each group of objectives, broken down into: total sanctions; U.S. multilateral; U.S. unilateral. The most successful score of 67% occurred in Group 2 where the objective was "destabilization' of a foreign government through application of multilateral sanctions. There were three episodes in this category, with two of the three scoring a 12 and one scoring an 8 in the outcome. While not a large number of cases for statistical analysis, the grouping of scores would tend to give some credibility to the outcome. However, by far the majority of sanctions cases are unilateral U.S. where the objective was a modest change in policy. For the 43 unilateral cases recorded, only 8 achieved an outcome score of 9 or more for a success rate of 23%.

From the data and scoring method available in the Institute analysis, we can profile the history of U.S. sanctions and their success or failure from 1945 to 1990. Figure 2 traces the number of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions, for all five groups of foreign policy objectives, by their average outcome score for the year in which they were applied. The " successful outcome" score of 9 is the reference for the success or failure of the average scores plotted on the chart. Several points are worth noting: the frequency of sanctions increase notably after 1970; the number of sanctions over time also increase; average success scores are correspondingly less.

For the same period, 1970 to 1990, the number of U.S. unilateral sanctions that targeted modest outcomes were about twice the number of sanctions that aimed at more demanding foreign policy goals. Yet, their success scores for modest objectives were equally poor. Figure 3 shows the overall record of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions and outcomes scored by the Institute for the entire post World War II period.

In summary, according to the Institute's analysis, for all the foreign policy objectives defined and scored in the period 1945-1990, U.S. multilateral sanctions had a success rate of 32% (Iraq sanctions not scored); U.S. unilateral sanctions a success rate of 25%.

Comment:

The reason for the apparent ineffectiveness of sanctions may be explained in the development of the global economy. The recovery of Europe from World War II was a factor in that markets became less dependent on the U.S. The economic development of Asian economies in the 70's and 80's, and growing today, gave a special boost to alternative sources for countries under sanction. In the global market, the U.S. was and is becoming less dominant in its economic leverage as a tool of foreign policy. With economic development, countries also developed a sense of independence, especially those having experienced the yoke of colonialism. With independence came pride, political assertiveness, sovereign identity and the attendant desire to pursue the national interest quite separate from the U.S. For these and other reasons, the fact is that unilateral U.S. economic sanctions have a very poor record of success on a score card that includes all five of the objectives defined by the Institute

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