25 April 1997
US-Iran Conference
Speech By Stefan van Wersch, First Secretary,
Netherlands Embassy (Current Eu Presidency)Ladies and gentlemen,
Let me first stress that it is indeed an honour and a pleasure to speak at this Conference, organized by highly reputable organizations as Rutgers University and The Middle East Institute. There is in Washington, sometimes, a certain tendency to overlook the stance of the European Union on certain matters. I commend the organizers of this Conference for not making this mistake.
It is also a challenge to explain EU policy towards Iran in the USA and indeed it bears a certain ressemblance to a mission under chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. operating in a not really permissive environment: one tends to encounter strong, negative feelings in the US on the EU policy towards Iran. Some observations from the EU perspective, and, as I hope, an open and frank discussion afterwards are therefore appropriate. In fact, a discussion of both the US and EU policy and their interaction seem timely in view of recent events.
This challenge is however not the real problem today. It is rather that the EU policy is in temporary limbo due to recent developments, namely the verdict of the German Court in the Mykonos case.
Subsequent to the verdict, the Europe Union has suspended its critical dialogue with Iran and recalled its Ambassadors for consultations. In its declaration the Union underlined that it had always wanted a constructive relationship with Iran but that progress in this field was impossible while Iran flouts international norms and engages in acts of terrorism.
By the way, in view of some comments in the US media in the style of "we told you so", I would like to remark that the Mykonos verdict did not surprise the EU. Iran's involvement in acts like the Mykonos assassinations, which, between brackets, predated the critical dialogue, was rather one of the reasons to engage in the dialogue. So the reply to "we told you so" remarks can simply be: thanks anyhow, but we already knew.
The recalled Ambassadors have not yet returned in view of further consultations within the EU framework. The pivotal discussion on the political level is scheduled for Monday next when the General Affairs Council, the EU meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, will meet in Brussels. Until then there is no clarity on the European policy, which does not make it particularly easy for me to address you today.
Still, some observations can be made. The critical dialogue, Europe's policy of constructive engagement with Iran, has been suspended - and probably will remain suspended for still some time - but not cancelled. A full cancellation is in my assessment even quite unlikely. It remains therefore worthwhile to discuss the background of this dialogue, which has proven to be an unfortunate rimple in the EU-US relationship.
Let me emphasize first that the US and EU assessments of the Iranian policy overlap to a high degree. Both strive to improve Iran's behaviour, ultimately aiming at a full Iranian observance of international law. In the critical dialogue the EU has consistently tabled the many issues that form the core of the US concern, namely Iranian involvement in terrorism, their amassing of an arsenal of both conventional and non-conventional arms (among which weapons of mass destruction), the Iranian opposition to the peace process, Iran's poor human rights record and the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. Be assured that this dialogue, which is sometimes portrayed as an open-ended, non-committal kind of chat, has indeed been very critical: I am not in a position to distribute the read-outs of these meetings but let there be no misunderstandings on the tone. I underline further that the US has never excluded the possibility of having a dialogue with Iran, the so-called authorized dialogue.
The EU considers its policy, therefore, not as contrary to the US policy but rather as complementary. The policy differences are not about the assessment of the problem nor the ultimate goal but about the means to reach the goal.
In the EU's judgement, an isolation of Iran by economic measures or sanctions, as pursued by the US in its containment policy, would not attain the desirable goals we all share. Let me add that my next remark is a personal one - I cannot predict what will be the exact outcome of the General Affairs Council next Monday - but I would be amazed if the EU policy on this point will fundamentally change since the arguments for it are still as valid as before.
Iran's importance in the region, its size, number of inhabitants, resources, geographic position and its role as regional power, make it both impossible and undesirable to isolate this country. It would be an illusion to think that sanctions, even if they would be broader than just the unilateral US boycot, would be effective and bring the Iranian government to its knees. Let 's be frank: there is not much evidence in recent history that sanctions of this kind lead to the desired aims. From the purely functional point of view they might be succesfully implemented and, for instance, cut off oil exports. Politically, however, the results tend to be far less conspicuous, and then I leave aside the sometimes alarming humanitarian consequences.
In the EU judgement, an isolation policy might rather have the adverse effect and stiffen Iran in its defiance. Let me just mention one element. As you know, anti-western feelings constitute part of the hard core of the fundamentalist creed. Isolating Iran rather than engaging in a dialogue, however difficult and discouraging, would only fulfil the fundamentalist prophesies and by virtue of that bolster the hard line elements in the government. In general the EU attaches a high importance to a dialogue with islamic countries, which are the EU's direct neighbours.
The EU has always believed, without harbouring any illusions on this point, that a dialogue, in which all issues will be tabled, in the long run stands a better chance of having a moderating influence on Iran. The EU-member states have further held the belief that this critical dialogue can go together with economic and commercial ties. Economic ties might even reinforce the dialogue by increasing Iran's interaction with the international market and by encouraging economic reform into the direction of a free market economy. Let me add that more examples can be given of countries with which the EU, or for that matter the US, has economic and commercial ties without refraining from strong criticism on, for instance, those countries' human rights records.
For the record - and for those who believe that the EU policy is cynically and exclusively geared toward commercial goals -, I would note that for most EU states Iran is not a really important trade partner and that EU exports to Iran have shown a downward movement in recent years.
Further, it is my personal assessment that in general there seems to be more grass roots support in the US for policies of isolation and economic sanctions than in Europe, where the belief prevails that suspension of free trade will not change the behaviour of rogue states. Probably it has also to do with a different cultural mentality toward questions like how to deal with "difficult" states.
At this point I don't want to omit mentioning that there is full consensus in Europe on one other point, namely that legislation with extra-territorial effects in order to force third states to comply with the US policy toward for instance Iran, is considered fully unacceptable on principle. Legislation of this kind is not conducive to a common EU-US stance on Iran. European capitals don't like it when their policy is being made in Washington -- and I would like to see the outrage in Washington if it was the other way around.
All this does not mean that the critical dialogue until now has been particularly successful. Results are limited, though not absent: I refer to Iran's signing of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, for which the EU wants to take some credit, the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its cooperation with the IAEA and some humanitarian cases. The importance of having a channel to put pressure on Iran with regard to human rights issues should not be underestimated. Overall the dialogue, however, has undeniably been a discouraging experience for those engaged in it. Under the current circumstances it is even an unviable way of engaging Iran.
The current crisis is proof that the critical dialogue needs a critical assessment. The European Council of Luxemburg of April 1996 already underlined that the critical dialogue has to become more results-oriented. Member states' Parliaments and the public, which are particularly sensitive to the lack of progress in the Rushdie case, have expressed irritation with regard to the lack of concrete results. As I explained above, I do not believe that the EU will give up the concept of a critical dialogue, which from the methodological point of view is still considered the most effective policy, but within the concept there is space for adjustment. More sticks might be added to the carrots.
Further we seem to have reached a crucial juncture, opening possibilities for a closer coordination and convergence between US and EU policies. The results of the critical dialogue might be considered poor, but we should not forget that the same goes for the US policy. Both parties have reached a stage where rethinking is appropriate and a renewed bid for closer cooperation logical. Iran should indeed not be allowed to live under the impression that it can drive a wedge between the US and EU. In fact, closer coordination is already underway.
Let me add, at the end of this short discourse, one observation that is often overlooked in the USA. The media and some think tanks in the US regularly urge the EU to follow the US policy. In my assessment more convergence is possible, but a mere signing on to the US sanction policy is at present not in the books. The EU is a Union of 15 member states which do not have the exact same ideas on dealing with Iran, nor the same interests. The critical dialogue has proven to be the common denominator on which the 15 were able to have a common policy. The alternative to this policy is not something similar to the US policy, but rather the end of a common policy, and in stead of it, 15 more or less competing policies, of which some might be even more disliked by the US than the critical dialogue. This, of course, would definitively not serve our common goals but only play into the Iranian hands.
I thank you.
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