22 September 1997
Journal of Commerce
Carroll J. Doherty

Sanctions: nice idea but...

WASHINGTON - They are unweildy, hard to enforce and usually deemed a failure. Yet sanctions aimed at punishing foreign governments have never been more popular in the United States.

In spite of objections raised by economists and foreign policy experts against trade and other financial sanctions, they have emerged as the pre-eminent weapon in Congress' diplomatic arsenal. "Congress loves sanctions," observed Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, D-Ind.

Already, there are scores of these imperfect measures on the books, intended to curb unfair trade practices, nuclear proliferation, human rights abuses, drug trafficking and female genital mutilation, while promoting environemntal initiatives and solving countless other world problems.

A brand new slate of proposed sanctions is before Congress this fall, including one to root out religious persecution and another to punish Syria and Sudan for their alleged support of terrorism.

Indeed, the popularity of sanctions has spread well beyond the halls of Congress to other parts of the United States.

With little fanfare, state and local govenments have been churning out laws to restrict their purchases from companies with investments in Myanmar, Indonesia and Nigeria, whose governments have been condemned for abusing human rights. A bill moving through the New York Legislature would inflict similar penalities on companies operating in Switzerland, which has been accused of pilfering the assets of Holocaust victims.

The attraction of sanctions is simple. "When people are compelled to 'do something,' sanctions are a lot less costly than sending in the Marines," said Richard Haass, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and a former special assistant to President Bush.

But in most instances, Congress and local governments are responding to the intense pressure from well-organized domestic political groups with ethnic, cultural, environmental or other grievances against a foreign regime. Yet even some of the most ardent proponents will admit that as a foreign policy tool, sanctions are flawed.

The economic cost to the United States of its own sanctions can be staggering and has deeply colored the debate over China and, increasingly, other regimes. Faced with the loss of millions in overseas sales, corporate America lately has been drawn to the barricades.

Once fearful of tangling with powerful champions of sanctions such as the Cuban-American lobby, more than 600 of the nation's largest corporations have joined a coalition called USAEngage to warn lawmakers that imposing sanctions can cost trade opportunities abroad and jobs at home.

In 1996, congress slapped sweeping new sanctions on foreign companies investing in Cuba, Libya and Iran, and imposed a ban on new U.S. investment in Myanmar (formerly Burma). A year later, the dicrators are still firmly in power. Cuba's Fidel Castro, in fact, has weathered more than 35 years of U.S. economic punishment.

Other sanctions laws have fared little better. Anti-narcotics statutes, under which nations considered uncooperateive in the drug war are denied foreign aid and international bank loans, have done little to step drug flows from Latin America.

Critics say that such sanctions can complicate or even poisen U.S. diplomacy. Europe and Canada have protested bitterly over penalties against their companies doing business with Cuba, Libya or Iran. Myanmar's brutal military junta was welcomed into meeting of an important Asian alliance just weeks after it was hit with sanctions by the United States. Chinese leaders seethe over the annual debate in Congress on their country's trade privileges.

Nor does the State Department like it when Congress tries to make foreign policy with this blunt weapon.

Sanctions are an ancient tool of diplomacy - a form of punishment short of a blockade or outright invasion.

Some sanctions have worked, emboldening advocates in Congress. Those against South Africa in the mid-1980s contributed mightily to the demise of apartheid.

But successful sanctions most often have broad international support. The trade embargo the United Nations slapped on Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait succeeded in isolating Iraq, diplomatically and economically. While Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein retains a firm grip on power, the sanctions have prevented him from rebuilding his military to its former strength.

Western sanctions also were instrumental in pressuring Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic to turn up the heat on his Serbian allies in Bosnia to reach a peace agreement.

However, it is practically an article of faith among economists that unilateral sanctions are doomed to failure. Dictators and military juntas remain in power; human rights still are violated; endangered animals are slaughtered; children still are worked to death.

With the global marketplace ever more tightly bound and competitive, unilateral sanctions leak like a sieve. Washington adds to the shortfall by applying them inconsistently. Behavior that draws sanctions in one country is ignored in another, if it is considered more vital to U.S. interests.

Carroll J. Doherty writes for Congressional Quarterly

Home |  About Us |  Resources |  Press Releases |  Federal Activity & Legislation
State & Local Activity |  NFTC Lawsuit |  Contact Us |  Site Index

.