28 May 1997
The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
Gerald F. SeibSanctions Pain: Does It Bring Any Real Gain?
GATHER AROUND, children, for today's quiz on foreign policy.
Question 1. True or false: Iran, Iraq, Libya and Cuba do many things America doesn't like, so the best way to change their behavior is to cut off economic ties. That will give America the leverage needed to make them behave better.
Question 2. True or false: China does many things America doesn't like, so the best way to change its behavior is to foster economic ties. That will give America the influence needed to make it behave better.
If you answered true to both of these questions, your thinking may be a little confused. But you are precisely in tune with Washington policy.
Now is a good time to ponder this muddled thinking, because the U.S. faces two decisions with profound consequences. On China, the annual debate over renewing its "most favored nation" trade status is commencing, with the outcome unclear and the stakes higher than ever. At the same time, the stunning results of Iran's presidential election last weekend, in which the "moderate" candidate won resoundingly, guarantee a debate over whether the U.S. should ease its policies there.
AS THESE DEBATES unfold, consistency is probably too much to hope for and maybe isn't even desirable. But we could use a little more clarity of thinking. Economic sanctions may be perfectly justifiable, either because they make the right moral point in international affairs, or simply because they make Americans feel better. But if history is any guide, sanctions usually don't go very far in changing the way other nations actually behave.
"You have to have sanctions as part of your diplomatic arsenal," says Jeffrey Schott, an analyst at the Institute for International Economics who studies sanctions. "But you have to recognize that in most cases sanctions aren't going to be very useful in moving you toward your policy goal. They are increasingly becoming symbolic statements of policy."
Yet in the murky world of post-Cold War diplomacy, the U.S. seems to be resorting to sanctions more often. In the last four years, the U.S. has authorized unilateral sanctions of some kind on 35 different nations. More and more of these sanctions are imposed by Congress in legislation rather than through decisions by the executive branch. Sanctions imposed by legislation almost invariably are less flexible and harder to adjust to changing conditions. The nadir of this trend was the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, which not only codifies America's economic embargo of Cuba but, remarkably, also allows foreign companies to be sued in the U.S. for doing business in Cuba.
Yet, in reality, Cuba provides the best illustration of how futile economic sanctions can be. It has lived under the most onerous of U.S. sanctions for more than three decades. Yet Fidel Castro rules on, having outlasted eight American presidents.
OVERALL, MR. SCHOTT'S Institute for International Economics has argued that U.S. economic sanctions had "positive foreign policy outcomes" in only one in five cases in the 1970s and 1980s. There are bright spots, of course. South Africa stands out as one example. The key to success there, though, was broad international participation in sanctions.
There is no such international consensus today over either Iran or China. American commerce with Iran is blocked under both a law banning transactions with governments that aid terrorists, and another that imposes sanctions against any person or company that invests more than $40 million in Iran's oil industry. These sanctions may have pinched Iran some, but they hardly seem to have prompted any wholesale policy changes.
So now, here's one reasonable strategy. Continue banning trade in materials that might directly aid terrorists or allow Iran to make chemical or nuclear arms. But use this moment to declare a willingness to relax other restrictions once Iran's support for terrorism subsides. Many Iranians seem to want a relationship with the U.S., and they should see that by picking a more reasonable leader they've made it possible.
On China, the prevailing U.S. thinking is that economic openings to the West eventually will produce liberalization in the Chinese government, and that, besides, China is simply too big and important to shun. Odds are that this view will prevail again.
Along the way, though, it would be nice if the U.S. could establish some clearer principles guiding these decisions. Just Tuesday, House Democratic leader Richard Gephardt, who argues against renewing China's MFN status because of its record on human rights and missile proliferation, declared in a speech in Detroit: "The people of the world yearn for a consistent American human rights policy." That's a sentiment that ought to attract some sympathy on both sides of the coming sanctions debates.
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