Statement by senator Christopher J. Dodd

Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing to Review Legislation on Economic Sanctions Reform

July 21, 1999

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this hearing this afternoon to review the various legislative proposals for reforming US economic sanctions policy. This is a very important issue that falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Relations and it is important that their committee give it serious consideration.

I am particularly pleased to have been given the opportunity to join Senators Lugar, Hagel and Ashcroft to explain the various legislative initiatives we have been working on to fundamentally overhaul United States sanctions policy.

Let mw say at the outset that I am supportive of all the proposals that we will discuss this afternoon. There is clearly some overlap with respect to the issues that various bills attempt to address. I see the legislation taken together see complementary rather than competing-- containing all the necessarily ingredients to form the basis of a comprehensive reform of United States sanctions policy.

Senator Lugar, for example, has worked long and hard to refine legislative guidelines and procedures for both the legislative and executive branches to follow the imposition of future sanctions. He has also undertaken the difficult task of defining what we mean by unilateral economic sanctions. Let me ass that without their leadership on the subject of sanctions reform over the last two years, we could not be here today discussing pr\ending legislation or contemplating a committee markup on this matter in the not too distant future.

Senators Hagel and Ashcroft have also worked together to come up with legislative provisions to address the problem of sanctions on the sale of food and medicine. I am very supportive of Senator Hagel's and Senator Ashcroft's efforts and I am an original cosponsor of their legislation.

Members of Committee, I know, are well aware of my particular interest and concern with respect to using food and medicine as a foreign policy weapon against other countries. I believe it is inconsistent with American values and ideals, damages our international l moral authority, and unnecessarily harms American farm families who already suffer from one of the worst domestic farm economies in a decade or more.

I have introduces three separate sanctions related bills-- S 926 --the Cuban Food and Medicine Security Act of 1999; S 927-- the Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1999; and S 1161--the Economic Sanctions Reform Act of 1999. The focus of these legislative initiatives has been to provide streamlined guidelines for both the Executive and Legislative Branches to follow in considering the imposition of future sanctions as well as to provide critical waiver authority t the President to guarantee that sufficient flexibility is preserved in the context of legislatively mandated sanctions, both current and perspective. I have also introduced legislation to stop, once and for all, the policy of prohibiting the sale of food and medicine to the Cuban people-- legislation which currently has 24 cosponsors. (the House companion bill has 146 cosponsors)

I will touch briefly later in my remarks on what I see as necessary ingredients for crafting a comprehensive sanctions reform legislative proposal drawing from the bills before us today. I would hope that this committee would be about to undertake such an effort in the very near future. Today is the first step in attempting to do so.

But first, Mr. Chairman, I would like to digress for a moment ti try to provide some historical perspective on how we have gotten to where we are today with respect to US sanctions policy and why their is growing urgency to take a hard look at current practice in this area.

Eighty years ago, President Wilson formally added economic sanctions to America's Foreign policy arsenal for the first time, saying that with sanctions as a weapon, "their will be no need for force". In the intervening decades, we have taken greater liking to sanctions that President Wilson ever could have imagined. I doubt very much , however, that he would approve of the way in which we employ that too today nor the results accomplished by sanctions.

When President Wilson described his idea of sanctions as a diplomatic tool, he was trying to convince the Senate to ratify American membership in the League of Nations. The sanctions he envisioned were broad, muli-national efforts designed to affect specific results under limited circumstances. He also intended sanctions to serve as one component of a multi-stage escalation of diplomatic pressure, rather than a complete response.

In addition, the vast majority of American sanctions are not the multilateral efforts President Wilson envisioned. Rather in most cases, their are unilateral efforts which anger our allies, damage our global standing, and hurt our own business people. And lest we excuse the drawbacks of unilateral sanctions with the argument that the benefits for American foreign policy outweigh the harm, let me be very clear: there are very rarely such benefits.

That is why pressure for meaningful sanctions reform has intensified over the last year of s US interests have been sacrificed, yet their have been no visible offsetting successes-- namely the altering of offending behavior or policies of the sanctions countries.

We in this body often think of sanctions as costless actions since they requires no governmental appropriations. As business leaders and workers across eh country will tell you, however, that perception is simply erroneous. In 1998, the United States sanctions, of some sort, in place against 26 different nations including China and India, the two most populous nations of the world. Those sanctions covered well over half of the world's population, cutting American firms off from billions of potential customers.

According to a highly respected Washington-based think tank-- the Institute for International Economics, the economic sanctions currently in effect cost American businesses $20 billion annually in lost export sales and cost American workers 200,000 high-wage jobs.

Those figures, however, tell only part of the story. The cost to businesses does not end when the sanctions are repealed. Rather, the absence of American companies allows foreign competitors to make inroads laving American concerns defenseless in a battle against well entrenched foreign competition, as well as lingering popular resentment towards the United States, when barriers are finally lifted

Now we all know that for every economic study like the one I have just cited that finds the costs of sanctions to be significant, critics will site other studies that have been done that find the contrary I believe that the best way to gauge who is right on the question of cost is to listen to the level of public criticism that is being leveled against our sanctions currently. By that measure, Mr. Chairman, I would say that the American public is on the side of those economists who have found the costs to be high.

Nearly 700 large and small US businesses, associations and farm groups from across the country have joined together as a coalitions called USA Engage in order to support and promote sanction reform legislation among the lines of the legislative proposals we have before us today. Were there not real economic harm being done by our policies in Washington we all know that such an effort would not have been mounted by people who have a lot of other important things to so with their time.

I am not arguing, Mr. Chairman, that certain sanctions are not a legitimate foreign policy tool nor that, if used appropriately, they cannot be useful. There are certainly occasions when Congress can and should consider sanctions related legislation. Or the President, sanctions by executive order. For example, I strongly support the existing sanctions against countries such as Iraq and Yugoslavia.

However, I would make the point that Congress in particular is ill equipped to legislatively micro-manage out foreign policy on a day to day basis. Yet too often the sanctions legislation we enact in this body tries to do just that. I the final analysis, the power to negotiate with foreign governments and leaders rests solely with the President. Anything which detracts from the Presidents ability to negotiate, including mandated sanctions with no waiver authority, damages his ability to exact concessions and come to an agreement which best serves US national interests.

Sanctions in my view will always warren a place, at times perhaps a prominent place, in our foreign policy arsenal. Working with our allies, they can have the power President Wilson described shortly after witnessing the horrors of World War I. At the same time, Mr. President, we must not be so infatuated with sanctions that we forget that we have other options at our disposal some of which have been around for more than two centuries, namely good old fashioned diplomacy.

Let me turn now to describe in a conceptual way what I see as the most important components that must be part of any consensus bill this committee develops:

First, we should codify the recently articulated Clinton Administrating policy forswearing the use of food and medicine as a foreign policy weapon as Senator hagel and Ashcroft have proposed. This policy has been harmful to everyone concerned as I said earlier it has eroded our moral standing internationally.

Second, we should draw from Senator Lugar's legislation with respect to the guidelines he has crafted to govern the imposition of future sanctions by both the Congress and the Executive Branch. . I would hope that we could work to simplify these guidelines somewhat, so that they are easily understood and therefore more likely to be adhered to by all concerned.

Third, we must ensure that the President has available sufficient flexibility to allow him to conduct United States foreign policy effectively, while also ensuring that the Congress remains a partner in developing and supporting these policies. I have proposed waiver authority in both S. 927 and S 1161, together with expedited Congressional procedures so that Congress can play a role in Presidential decisions that modify legislatively mandated sanctions.

Fourth, "multilateralized" sanctions should always be the preferred Option whenever the imposition of sanctions is under consideration. Multilaterally imposed sanctions have a far better likelihood of succeeding than those that are unilaterally imposed. Moreover they tend to minimize the competitive disadvantages to the U.S. economy.

Fifth, there must be some process for periodic review of the sanctions that are imposed by both branches of government and for terminating those sanctions which no longer serve U.S. interests -- either by sunset provisions such as those contained in Senator Lugar's bill or some form of generic authority to permit the President to terminate them in such instances.

Sixth and finally, we must have a common understanding about what we mean when we talk about economic sanctions. I know this is of particular interest to Senator Biden and Senator Sarbanes. I would urge the Committee to take a look at the definition of sanctions contained in S. 1161. It is fairly simple and straight forward but encapsulates a workable definition of economic sanctions, it states in part that a sanction is "any measure taken by the United States that is designed to advance United States foreign policy or national security interests that constrains economic activities (and) U.S. government programs or benefits that would otherwise be available."

Mr. Chairman, if we can craft comprehensive sanctions reform legislation which incorporates the components I have just mentioned, we will enable the United States government, both the executive and the legislative branches, to be more precise in the choice of sanctions, more realistic with respect to what is achievable, better informed of the potential costs to the US economy and the American people, and more sensitive to the potential impact on innocent populations and on relations with other governments.

In conclusion, with economic sanctions fast becoming the very core of United States foreign policy, I believe that a more thoughtful and comprehensive approach to them is desperately needed before we do serious harm to our own national interests. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, as well as with Senators Lugar, Hagel and other members of this committee in crafting a comprehensive legislative package that addresses the concerns increasingly being raised by a broad cross section of the American public, while still preserving our ability to utilize appropriated targeted sanctions when circumstances warrant them.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to testify on this very important subject.

 

  Return to Top

Home |  About Us |  Resources |  Press Releases |  Federal Activity & Legislation
State & Local Activity |  NFTC Lawsuit |  Contact Us |  Site Index